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Abstract 
With increasing speed, virulence, and sophistication, selfpropagating worms continue to pose a serious threat 
to the safety of the Internet. To effectively identify and defend against selfpropagating worms, a critical task is to 
characterize a worm. along multiple dimensions. Content-based fingerprinting is a well-established dimension for 
worm characterization by deriving the most representative content sequence as a worm's signature. However, this 
dimension alone does not capture all aspects of a worm and may therefore lead to incomplete or inaccurate worm 
characterization. 
To expand the space of worm characterization, this paper proposes and just$es a new dimensiorz, behavioral 
footprinting. Orthogonal and complementary to content-based fingerprinting, behavioral footprinting characterizes 
a worm's unique behavior during each infection session., which covers the probing, exploitation, and replication 
phases of the infection session. By modeling each infection step as a behavior phenotype and the entire infection 
session as a sequential behavioral footprint, we show that behavioral footprinting captures worn-specific behavior 
which is inherently different from a normal access to the vulnerable service. We present advanced sequence analysis 
techniques to extract a worm's behavioral footprint from its infection traces. Our evaluation with a number of real- 
world worms clearly demonstrates its feasibility and effectiveness in successfilly extracting worm-characterizing 
behavioral footprints for all experimented worms. Furthermore, by comparing with content-based jingerprinting, 
our e.xperiments demonstrate the uniqueness and robustness of behavioral footprinting in worm recognition and 
identification. 
Keywords: Worm Recognition and Characterization, Behavioral Footprinting, Content-Based Fingerprinting 
1 Introduction 
Self-propagating worms continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of the Internet, To effectively identify and 
defend against self-propagating worms, a critical task is to characterize a worm along multiple dimensions. Content- 
based fingerprinting [26, 28, 33, 431 is a well-established dimension to capture a worm's characteristics by deriving 
the most representative content sequence as the worm's signature. In practice, various intrusion detection systems 
(IDSes) [36, 411, together with recent honeypot systems [5, 22, 38,461, are deployed to collect live worms. Once a 
worm specimen1 is collected, anti-worm experts will manually examine the specimen and extract a worm-identifying 
content fingerprint as the worm's signature. Recent systems [26, 28, 33, 431 take one step further by automatically 
generating worms' content fingerprints. These systems have demonstrated a degree of success. However, they all 
'The worm specimen mieht not only contain the worm binary itself. but also include other corresponding traffic associated with a worm 
infection (e.g., exploitation). 
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focus on one dimension of worm characterization, namely content, while missing other aspects of a worm. This 
single-dimension characterization may limit the capability of worm identification and recognition. For example, i t  has 
been demonstrated that advanced worms are now capable of exploiting the weakness of content-based fingerprinting 
by mutating [45] or encrypting [27] their contents or payloads in each infection session, hence escaping recognition 
and identification by content fingerprints. 
We are motivated to explore other dimensions to expand the space of worm characterization and thus enhance worm 
identification capabilities. Especially, we realize that content-based fingerprinting does not capture a worm's temporal 
infection behavior, which contains valuable self-identifying information that leads to the worm's recognition. In this 
paper, we present and justify a new dimension, behavioral footprinting, to enrich worm characterization. We would 
like to emphasize that behavioral footprinting is expected to be orthogonal and complementary to other dimensions 
including content fingerprinting. This new dimension alone also suffers from ineffectiveness towards certain worms. 
In this paper, we target the type of worms [7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 30, 3 1, 371 that exploit traditional vulnerable servers 
(e.g., ApacheIIIS, DNS, and Sendmail) to propagate themselves without any human intervention. Qther types of 
worms (e.g., mass-mailing or IM worms [ l l ]  involving end user interactions) are subjects of future work. Our 
contributions are mainly three-fold: 
Firstly, we propose behavioral footprinting as a fundamentally new dimension for the characterization of self- 
propagating worms. Unlike content fingerprinting which extracts one or a few static worm-unique byte sequences as 
signature, behavioral footprinting essentially captures a worm's unique temporal action sequence during an infection 
session, which covers the probing 2 ,  e.xploitation, and replication phases of the infection session. Our evaluation 
(Section 4) with a number of real-world worms clearly demonstrates the existence of worm-specific behavioral foot- 
prints. 
Secondly, we develop robust algorithms to extract the behavioral footprint from a worm's infection traces. More 
specifically, by representing each step within a worm's infection session as a behavioral phenotype and the complete 
infection session as a behavioral phenotype sequence, we observe that the sequence reflects both worm-specific 
exploitation and propagation strategies. Given traces of only a few infection sessions, our algorithms (Section 3) are 
able to accurately and robustly extract a worm's behavior footprint, despite possible worm behavior mutation and 
camouflaging, such as cloaking authentic phenotypes or forging phenotypes. 
Thirdly, by comparing with content-based fingerprinting, we demonstrate the uniqueness and robustness of behavior- 
based footprinting in worm recognition and identification. Because of their orthogonality, behavior-based footprinting 
is naturally robust against attacks that evade content-based fingerprinting. Our experiments show instances of worms 
that cannot be identified by content fingerprints but are recognizable using behavior footprints, justifying behavioral 
footprinting as a complementary dimension for worm characterization. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we demonstrate the existence of behavioral footprints 
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in self-propagating worms and make a case for the new dimension of behavior-based footprinting. We then describe 
in Section 3 our algorithms to extract a worm's behavioral footprint. We present experimental results with a number 
of real worms in Section 4. Limitations and possible improvements are described in Section 5. We present related 
work in Section 6 and finally conclude this paper in Section 7. 
2 A Case for Behavioral Footprinting 
In this section, we first present a staged view of a worm infection session to motivate the characterization of worm 
behavior. As representative examples, we illustrate the existence of behavioral footprints in two well-known worms: 
the MSBlaster worm propagating on Windows platform and the Lion worm on Linux platform. Finally, we make a 
case for behavioral footprinting. 
2.1 A Staged View of Worm Infection 
In general, the infection of a self-propagating worm from an infected host to a victim host can be broken into three 
phases: 
Target SelectionIProbing 
A Worm A Victim 
Replication 
Figure 1. A Staged View of a Worm Infection Session 
Phase I :  Target selection and probing Using a strategy such as random or biased address scanning, a scanning 
worm during this stage attempts to pick up a victim for infection. For example, an ICMP echo request packet or a 
TCP SYN probe is used to infer the reachability of a chosen target. Additional packets may also be used to obtain the 
version of a possibly vulnerable service. We note that this phase may not exist for non-scanning worms because they 
may carry a pre-computed target list. 
Phase 2: E.xploitation Once the worm receives a positive response from the victim host, a number of malicious 
packets3 may be sent over attempting to exploit the targeted vulnerability. Successful exploitation will result in the ex- 
ecution of a specifically crafted code in the victim node. Different worms usually implement different functionalities 
in the crafted code. 
Phase 3: Replication If the exploitation is successful, an additional replication phase may follow to transmit a 
worm replica to the victim node. The replica will be installed in the victim node, completing this infection session. 
We will show that the behavior exhibited by the worm during this infection session contains valuable self-identifying 
information that can be used to characterize and identify the worm. Especially, the temporal order of infection steps 
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taken by the worm reflects the intrinsic dependencies that must be followed to ensure a successful infection. 
2.2 Example I: Windows-Based MSBlaster Worm 
We consider the infamous MSBlaster worm [9] as the first motivating example. The MSBlaster worm exploits an 
RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026) for its infection. An MSBlaster infection session is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The infection session consists of the following steps: 
Figure 2. An Infection Session of the MSBlasterNVindows Worm 
A three-way TCP handshake on port 135 is implicitly used by the worm to check the reachability of the 
selected target (Phase 1). 
Upon the establishment of the TCP connection, the worm sends a number of malicious packets (Phase 2), 
which exploit the known RPC-DCOM vulnerability[9] and contain a specially crafted shell-code. A successful 
exploitation will lead to the execution of the shell-code in the victim node. In the case of the MSBlaster worm, 
a new shell service will be started on TCP port 4444 by the shell-code. 
The new shell service on 4444/TCP is immediately contacted by the worm to send instructions on how to 
download the worm replica, i.e., msblast.exe (Phase 3). From Figure 2, the TFTP protocol is apparently used 
for the downloading. 
The above sequence of actions significantly deviates from a normal access to the RPC-DCOM service: First, after 
the "service request", a new shell service would not suddenly appear and listen on 4444/TCP in the victim host. 
Second, a new TCP connection to this port would not follow with the service request. Third and most importantly, 
it should not be observed that the victim took the initiative in using the TFTP protocol to download a file (with the 
name msblast.exe and size 6,372 bytes) from the service client. 
4 ~ i c r o s o f t ? s  DCOM Service Control Manager (also known as the RPC Endpoint Mapper) uses this port as a well-delined means to provide 
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2.3 Example 11: Linux-Based Lion Worm 
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Figure 3. An Infection Session of the LionILinux Worm 
The second illustrative example is the historical Linux-based Lion worm [4]. The Lion worm exploits a BIND 
vulnerability (CA-2001-02) for its infection. A Lion worm infection session is shown in Figure 3. 
The Lion worm firstly makes an explicit TCP connection attempt to the destination port 53. A successful con- 
nection indicates the reachability and possible vulnerability of the selected target (Phase 1 ) .  This connection, 
if established, is then immediately tore down without transmitting any payload. 
Another TCP connection to the same destination port is then established. This time, certain exploitation codes 
are sent (Phase 2). 
If the exploitation is successful, the shell script, which is transmitted together with the exploitation codes, will 
be executed to retrieve a worm replica from the infecter to the victim (Phase 3). 
Again, deviation from the normal access to DNS lookup service is observed: First, it is unlikely that the access 
would begin with a plain TCP connection with no payload. Second and most importantly, after the DNS lookup 
request, it is highly unusual that the BIND server on the victim side initiates a TCP connection to the DNS client on 
an unusual port 27374/TCP, followed by an HTTP session on this connection to transfer a file of 71; 680 bytes from 
the client to the sewer 
2.4 Behavioral Footprinting: a New Dimension 
In general, for the same vulnerable service, there exist intrinsic differences between a normal access to the service 
and a worm infection through the service: 
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Firstly, during the exploitation phase of a worm infection session, a worm will attempt to misuse a vulnerable 
service in a way that is different from a normal access. In fact, several recent works [ I ,  32, 471 have leveraged this 
difference to derive vulnerability models for worm defense. 
Secondly, the replication phase of a worm infection session should not happen during a normal access to the 
vulnerable service. In sharp contrast, it will appear in every successful worm infection. As shown in Figure 2, the 
4444/TCP connection and its encapsulated TFTP transmission will appear in every MSBlaster worm infection. 
Similarly, the 27374/TCP connection and its encapsulated HTTP session can be observed for every Lion worm 
infection (Figure 3). 
Finally, the entire sequence of infection steps during an infection session characterizes the worm's behavior, and is 
highly unlikely to appear in normal traffic. In fact, our experiments with real-world network traces result in zero false 
positive. Furthermore, for different worms exploiting the same vulnerable service, their sequences of infection steps 
are different. The reason is that different worms tend to have different exploitation means, replication idiosyncrasies, 
and payloads, even though they are exploiting the same vulnerability (Section 4.2). 
Based on the above observations, we are motivated to adopt a worm's infection step sequence during an infection 
session to characterize and thus uniquely identify the worm. We call this new dimension behavioral footprinting, 
in contrast to the well-known dimension of content-based fingerprinting. We emphasize that the two dimensions 
complement each other and they should be combined to overcome their own weaknesses (Section 5). Especially, 
since behavioral footprinting does not rely on payload content analysis, it is naturally resistant to content-based 
mutation and encryption attacks (Sections 4.4.1,4.4.2). 
3 Behavioral Footprint Representation and Extraction 
In this section, we first define the behavioral footprint and its representation. A simple pairwise alignment al- 
gorithm is then presented to extract a behavioral footprint from the traces of two infection sessions. To increase 
the robustness against more intelligent worms, we develop an advanced footprint extraction algorithm to accurately 
extract a worm's behavioral footprint from multiple infection sessions. 
3.1 Behavioral Phenotype and Footprint 
The term "behavioral phenotype" was originally coined in 1972 by Nyhan [35] to represent a behavior that was 
genetically determined in the same way as the physical features of a phenotype. Recall the staged view of worm in- 
fection session in Section 2, if we denote a worm's infection steps as the worm's behavioral phenotypes, the sequence 
of behavioral phenotypes manifested during the infection session will be defined as the worm's intrinsic behavioral 
footprint. From Section 2, the behavioral footprint uniquely reflects the behavioral characteristics of the worm (e.g., 




















Our proposed algorithms to extract worm behavior footprints are based on the sequence analysis techniques ex- 
tensively applied in bio-informatics areas. A common and important issue for bio-informatics research is to operate 
over a large sequences of strings such as DNA, RNA, and protein sequences to find certain pattern(s) amon2 them. 
Notice that any type of protein is a sequence of amino acid sub-units and there are only 20 different amino acids, 
which constitute the whole alphabet for protein sequence analysis. Similarly, if we consider all possible behavioral 
phenotypes during the worm infection as the alphabet, the behavioral footprint of a worm can be represented as a 
sequence of characters in the alphabet. For example, the behavioral footprint of the MSBlaster worm, based on the 
t t C 
infection session in Figure 2, can be represented as SI S P A I  . . . R] s2s;A2 . - . UIUl . . . R2, where the characters' 
definitions are: 
S1 : < TCP. 4581/in. fecter, 135/vl.ctim, S Y N  > 
t 
S: : < TCP. 135/victim, 4581/in fecter. S Y N .  ACK > 
Al : < TCP. 4581/in f ecter, 135/11ictim, ACK > 
R1 : < TCP. 4581/in, f ecter, 135/victim: RST > 
S2 : < TCP. 4599/in f ecter, 4444/1iictim. SY N > 
t 
S; : < TCP. 4444/zlictim: 4599/in,f ecter, S Y N .  ACIC > 
A2 : < TCP. 4599/in f ecter, 4444/victim, ACIC > 
t 
U1 : < UDP. 1552/victim, G9lin f ecter > 
U1 : < UDP. 69/1:n f ecter, 1552/victirn > 
R2 : < TCP,  4599/in f ecter, 4444/victim,, RST > 
The letters in the above footprint denote either TCP flows with different control bits (SYN, ACK, RST) or 
t C 
UDPIICMP flows (UII). The subscripts denote different flows. For example, Sf or sf5 represents the second step 
(SYN and ACK bits set) in a normal three-way TCP handshaking procedure. Without ambiguity, a unique well- 
known subsequence can be further shortened as a single character. For example, a TCP 3-way handshake sequence 
t 
(e.g., s i s ? A i ,  i = 1 ,2 ,  in previous sequence) could be simply defined as Ci (more in Section 4). 
In this example, every character is a tuple of several fields: the character representing a specific TCP flow has four 
fields < TCP. sourceport, destqort! TCP control bits >; the character related to a specific UDP flow has three fields 
< UDP. sou,rce-port. destqort >. Note that as different infection sequences might have different ports, a special 
wildcard field needs to be introduced. Using the MSBlaster worm as an example, the source ports (e.g., the port 
C 
4581, 4599, 1552 in S l ,  S2, Ul, respectively) vary with different infection sessions while the destination ports are 
t 
fixed (e.g., the port 135, 4444, 69 in S1, S2, U1, respectively). As such, the special wildcard field (instead of a fixed 
 he arrow sign is used to mark the traffk flow direction and can be omitted when it is implicitly implied. 
'A h i t e  set containing a limited number of values can also be introduced to more precisely capture the possible contents. For simplicity, 
this paper only mentions the wildcard field. 
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port number) is used for the source port field. Also, there are some worms, which might have a constant source port 
number (e.g., the Witty worm have a constant UDP source port 4000), but a random destination port. In this case, 
the wildcard is used to represent the destination port field. It is worth mentioning that although a worm infection 
session usually involves only two nodes (infecter and victim), a coordinated worm infection might involve more than 
two nodes (e.g., downloading the worm replica from a third-party). In this case, the wildcard field can be used to 
represent the infecter field. 
In addition, the number of fields in a phenotype may not be fixed. Additional fields can be added to each flow 
to include other meaningful information such as the packet length, particular content sequence, or even relative 
timing from the previous one (an example is shown in Section 3.3.1). In fact, the extensible nature of behavioral 
phenotype representation makes i t  easier to integrate worm characteristics of other dimensions. For example, the 
content-based fingerprint of a worm can be added to a behavioral phenotype, indicating the occurrence of the content 
during the corresponding infection step. Protocol compliance analysis and vulnerability-specific information can also 
be integrated to further improve the accuracy of worm identification. 
However, we would like to point out that due to different understanding or emphasis even for the same worm, 
different researchers might intend to extract different behavioral footprints (e.g., in terms of sequence length or field 
content). Such situation is similar to the content-based counterpart: Different content fingerprints may be chosen by 
different researchers for the same worm. For simplicity, this paper chooses a simple representation described in this 
Section. As shown in Section 4, such representation is capable of accurately characterizing existing worms. 
3.2 Pairwise Alignment Algorithm 
Based on the behavioral footprint representation, we first present an algorithm to extract a worm's behavioral 
footprint from two infection sequences of the worm. 
Given two infection sequences Pl = ~ 1 x 2 . .  .x, and P2 = yly2 . .  . ym, a pairwise alignment algorithm is 
primarily used to align these two sequences so that they could have the same length. Based on a pre-defined scoring 
matrix (e.g., a match yields 1 while a mismatch yields O), the alignment algorithm inserts gaps, if necessary, to 
achieve maximum alignment of the two sequences. The maximum alignment is defined as the sum of terms for each 
aligned pair of characters < xi; yj  > within the sequences (representing similarity s(xi; yj)), plus terms for each gap 
(representing penalty, p). The similarity and gap penalty are defined as a part of the scoring matrix and might be 
specific to different applicable scenarios. A global alignment scheme obtains the optimal global alignment between 
two sequences while a local alignment scheme looks for the best alignment between subsequences of them. There 
are two corresponding well-known dynamic programming algorithms, i.e., Needleman-Wunsch algorithm[l8] and 
Smith-Waterman algorithm[l8]. 
The idea in Needleman-Wunsch algorithm is to build up an optimal alignment using previous solutions or optimal 
alignments of smaller subsequences. A matrix A, indexed by i and j with one index for each sequence, is iteratively 
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constructed. The cell &(i. 3 )  is the score of the best alignment between the initial segment xlx2 . . . x, of x up to x, 
and the initial segment y 1 y 2 . .  . yJ of y up to yJ. Initially, .&(O. 0 )  = 0 ,  A(i7 0 )  = -ip,  A ( 0 .  j )  = - jp .  Then, the 
matrix is iteratively filled from top-left cells to bottom-right cells based on Eqn.(l). 
Each case represents an option how current &(i. j )  cell is derived from one of the other three cells (above-left 
[i - 1; j  - 11, above [i - 1: j ] ,  or left [i: j - 11). Once all values are calculated, the choices taken at each cell starting 
from the bottommost rightmost one are traced back so that an optimal global alignment is derived. An example 
alignment applying the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm to the Welchia worm [12] is shown in Figure 4. 
Sequence]: 1 1 1  I C I F I F I C Z U I U I - - R z  
I I I I I I  
C C C 
I 
Sequence 2: - - C I F  I F  I C ~ U I U I U Z U Z R Z  
Figure 4. Global Alignment with Needleman-Wunsch Algorithm. The choices made during the alignment 
are shown as "-" and "I". The "-" in the top sequence used as index i for 4 corresponds to the choice 
"above" [i - 1: j ] ,  the "-" in the bottom sequence used as index j  for 4 represents "left" choice [i, j - 11, 
while the " I "  in the middle shows the option "above-left" [i - 1, j  - 11. 
Smith-Waterman algorithm works similarly except that Eqn.(l) is modified for local alignment purpose. Particu- 
larly, one more case is added to reflect the possibility of starting a new local alignment. As such, the entry of 4 ( 2 ,  j )  
is refined with the value m a x ( A ( i ,  j ) .  0 )  during the iterative calculation of Eqn.(l). The traceback is not performed 
from the bottommost rightmost cell, but from the cell with the maximum value7. Keen readers might find another 
interesting application with the Smith-Waterman algorithm: if we associate a metric (e.g., number of matches) to the 
best alignment between subsequences of Sl and S 2 ,  the metric can also be used to indicate the similarity among 
the two sequences. In fact, the Smith-Waterman alignment is used in the next algorithm as a similarity-based scoring 
mechanism to build the relevant phylogenetic tree from a number of worm infection sequences. 
It is interesting that most existing self-propagating worms are still primitive with no behavior-polymorphic capabil- 
ities. Our experiments in Section 4 show that pairwise alignment is highly effective in extracting worm-characterizing 
behavioral footprints. However, even though the majority of current self-propagating worms are not polymorphic in 
behavior, it is likely that future worms will be more intelligent, given that certain libraries [16,25,42] rendering code 
polymorphic are readily available. As a result, the pairwise alignment algorithm might not be capable of characteriz- 
ing future worms. 
'A tie can be broken by arbitrarily choosing any cell with the maximum value 
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3.3 Phylogenetic Tree Algorithm 
In this section, we propose a robust algorithm to extract behavioral footprints of more advanced worms. The 
algorithm is based on our observation on the existence of behavioral invariants. Before presenting the algorithm, we 
further justify the existence of behavioral invariants even in advanced worms. 
3.3.1 Examining Behavior Invariants 
Similar to its counterpart - the content-polymorphic worm, a behavior-polymorphic worm could exhibit varying 
behavior during different infection sessions. Here we consider single-vector worms which target one vulnerability, 
because a multi-vector worm can be considered as the combination of several single-vector worm variants, each 
with only one infection vector. We have so far studied at least twenty self-propagating worms and their variants 
(including behavior-polymorphic worms we synthesize) targeting a number of different services on top of various 
operating systems, and have found behavioral invariant in each of them. Although we are not claiming that all worms 
will exhibit behavioral invariants, a significant fraction of them do, because behavioral invariants typically result 
from ( I )  restrictions imposed for successful exploitations, (2) common components in each infection session (e.g., 
same payload and replication method of a worm), or (3) in some cases, a worm's idiosyncrasies in its exploitation 
means, replication mechanisms, and self-carrying payloads. We present two examples to illustrate how restrictions 
for successful exploitations determine a worm's behavior invariants. 
The first example is related to the OpenSSL heap-based buffer overtlow exploited by the Slapper worm. As de- 
scribed in [37], the overflow is used twice by the worm to achieve a reliable infection. The first OpenSSL exploitation 
only attempts to locate the over-writable heap address within the vulnerable Apache address space, which is hardly 
predictable across all the servers. After the first exploitation, the acquired heap address is patched in the attack buffer 
within the second OpenSSL exploitation. It is expected that this two-phase exploitation enables a reliable infection. 
However, i t  has one more restriction that the two Apache processes handling these two exploitation connections 
should have the same heap layout, and thus ensure the validity of the heap address obtained from the first exploitation 
connection to the second exploitation connection. To satisfy the restriction, the worm must first exhaust the Apache's 
pool of servers before actual exploitation. The exhaustion is achieved by opening a succession of 20 connections8 
so that two fresh Apache processes can be spawned to handle the two exploitation connections. As such, a reliable 
Slapper worm infection requires a series of resource-exhausting TCP connections and two additional exploitations. 
These requirements will be essentially reflected as the behavioral invariants or invariant subsequence in Slapper 
worm's behavioral footprint. We will further analyze the Slapper worm in Section 4.4.3. 
The second example is related to the Slammer worm exploiting a simple buffer-overrun vulnerability in MS SQL 
servers. Due to the nature of the exposed vulnerability, only a single UDP packet with the following properties: 
























destination port 1434, packet type 4 ,  and size larger than 60 bytes, will successfully trigger the buffer overflow. Such 
requirement leads to the behavioral invariant of the Slammer worm, and is reflected in its behavioral footprint as: 
< UDP. */*. 1434/*.pnyload : "1041". sIze > 60 >. 
3.3.2 Building the Phylogenetic Tree 
By operating over a collection of a worm's infection sequences9, the worm's behavioral invariants can be reliably 
extracted by advanced sequence analysis techniques. More specifically, pairwise alignment is first performed to 
derive their relative similarities with each other (a.k.a., the Smith-Waterman alignment). Based on the similarities, 
a plzylogenetic tree will be built to guide the final stage of multiple sequence alignment to expose and extract the 
behavioral invariants. 
A phylogenetic tree is originally proposed to depict the evolutionary relationships of a group of life organisms. 
Here we are building the phylogenetic tree to extract the most fundamental footprint subsequences or invariants that 
are embedded within a number of related infection sequences S k ,  k = l..n. Some of the sequences might be 
explicitly mutated by inserting irrelevant subsequences or replacing some subsequence with another functionally- 
equivalent string. An algorithm called UPGMA [18] originally used in gene analysis has been applied to construct 
such a tree. Initially, each sequence Sk is considered as a cluster Ck. These clusters are iteratively grouped with the 
most related one so that, eventually, there is only one cluster left. The relatedness or similarity between two clusters 
Ci and Cj  is defined as d i j :  
where IICiII and JICjII denote the number of sequences in clusters Ci and Cj. The value of dpq is derived based on 
the Smith-Waterman scoring algorithm. The clustering algorithm is further described as follows: 
PHYLOGENETICTREECONSTRUCTION(S~ k = 1 . . . n) 
1 C+-@;T+-@ 
2 for each sequence Si i E 1 ..n 
3 do 
4 Assign a cluster Ci + {Si) 
5 and add it into C +- C U Ci 
6 Define a leaf Ni in T for Si 
7 for each any other sequence S j ,  j E i + 1 . . . n 
8 do 
9 Calculate the similarity between Si and Sj 
10 d i j  +- SMITH-WATER MAN(^^, S j )  
1 1  while IICll # 1 
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ij <- - TER (:#i,:#j)
1 II Gil -I-
9Such .
1
12 do Determine the two clusters Ci and Cj 
13 s.t. d i j  is maximum 
14 Define a new cluster Ck = Ci U Cj  
15 and calculate dkl  for all 1 
16 Remove Ci and Cj  from C ,  i.e., C t C - Ci - Cj  
17 Add Ck to C ,  i.e., C t C U Ck 
18 Add a parent node Nk to T with children Ni and N j  
19 return T 
The calculation in dkr  in step 15 can be conveniently performed based on following equation: 
The time and space complexity of the algorithm is 0 ( n 2 ) ,  since there are n - 1 iterations, with O ( n )  steps in each 
one. 
3.3.3 Aligning Mu1 tiple Sequences 
The phylogenetic tree is used to categorize the worm footprint sequences and guide the actual alignment of multiple 
sequences. Within the generated tree T the leaves contain the raw footprint sequences while intermediate nodes 
contain the sequences representing their children nodes. A simple post-order tree traversal algorithm (shown below) 
can be recursively applied to construct the representative sequences until the root of the tree T is reached. 
MULTIPLESEQUENCEALIGNMENT(T : PhylogeneticTree) 
1 i f T  # NULL 
2 then MULT~PLESEQUENCEAL~GNMENT(T.~~ f t ) ;  
3 MUL~TIPLESEQUENCEAL~GNMENT(T.I-ight); 
4 i f  T.le f t  # NULL AND T.right  # NULL 
5 then T.sequence t 
6 N E E D L E M A N - W U N S C H ( T . ~ ~  f t ,  r ight )  
The actual sequence construction is based on the global alignment alignment, i.e., the ~ e e d l e m a n - ~ u n z c h  algo- 
rithm (Section 3.2). An example run of the algorithm against a Welchia worm variant is illustrated in Fig 5. The 
sequence shown at the root of the tree 
< variable > CI ~ 1 6 ~ 2 6 ~ ~  < variable > R2 
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 
Figure 5. An Example Alignment of Multiple Worm Sequences/Footprints. These three sequences are 
modified from the original Welchia worm sequence (Section 4.3) for illustration purpose. The first 
sequence ignores the second rflp UDP connection for the SVCHOST.exe file. The second sequence 
contains the original infection sequence. The last one ignores the first ICMP probing. 
4 Evaluation 
In this section, we first describe our experimental environment (Section 4.1), which is used to trap "live7' worms 
and analyze historical worms. We then derive these worms' behavioral footprints (Section 4.2) and demonstrate their 
validity by showing that they not only differ significantly from normal service access behavior, but also accurately 
characterize the behavior of corresponding worms. Later, by comparing with content-based fingerprinting, our ex- 
periments further demonstrate the uniqueness (Section 4.3) and robustness (Section 4.4) of behavioral footprinting in 
worm recognition and identification. 
4.1 Experimental Environments 
Behavioral footprints characterize worms by capturing their dynamic infection sequences. The difficulty in vali- 
dating the proposed scheme lies in the safe collection of infection sequences of real-world worms. To address this 
challenge, we have implemented and deployed (1) Collapsar [22], a honeyfarm architecture to trap live, real-world 
worms and (2) vGround [23], a virtual worm playground environment to safely unleash and observe the dynamic 
infection behavior of historical real-world worms. 
4.1.1 Trapping Live Worms 
The goal of trapping live worms is to collect their malicious infection sequences. To achieve this goal, there are 
two important considerations: 
Honeypot services on dark address space There is a high concentration of malicious traffic in a dark (namely, 
unallocated) IP address space. By further deploying high-interaction honeypot services [22] in such dark ad- 
dress spaces, we are able to collect original traces of self-propagating worms. In our experimental environment 
(Collapsar), honeypots are deployed using virtual machines enabled by both VMware [6] and User-Mode Linux 
(UML) [ 171. 
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Off-site and distributed worm capture A high-interaction honeypot can be infected as a real host by propagat- 
ing worms. To collect a diverse set of worm infection traces, we have developed a number of honeypot traffic 
redirectors, which forward dark space traffic from distributed participating sites to a centralized location for 
easy worm trace collection. By using traffic re-direction techniques such as Proxy-ARP and GRE [20,21], the 
traffic redirectors are transparent to remote worm infectors. 
We first started the prototype of Collapsar in February 2003 and it was initially deployed in August 2003. Three 
redirectors are deployed in three Ethernet-based production networks and forward traffic to a centralized facility, 
which is located in a separate Ethernet LAN. Encouragingly, right after its deployment, it successfully captured one 
instance of the MSBlaster worm. Later in August 2004, we expanded Collapsar deployment to three more production 
networks: one local subnet network (20 IP addresses), one wireless LAN, and one DSL network. The DSL network 
is located in another administrative domain. The honeypots run a variety of commodity operating systems, including 
RedHat Linux 7.218.0, Windows XP Home Edition, FreeBSD 4.2, and Solaris 8.0. All traffic fromlto these honeypots 
are fully logged through the tcpdump tool. Using Collapsar, a number of live real-world worms such as MSBlaster 
[9], Enbiei [8], Welchia [12], and Sasser [13] are captured 'O. Further analysis of the worms are presented in Section 
4.2. 
4.1.2 Analyzing Historical Worms 
Our honeyfarm architecture Collapsar is able to capture currently propagating worms. However, it is unable to 
analyze other historical worms. To this end, we have created a virtual worm playground environment called vGround, 
where worms can be safely unleashed and monitored. vGround has the following features: 
Highfidelity with full-system virtualization Within a vGround, realistic end-hosts and network entities (e.g., 
routers and firewalls) are emulated using virtual machines [6, 171. The adoption of virtual machines brings 
great convenience and flexibility in supporting unmodified vulnerable services and operating systems. 
Strict confinement with link-layer network virtualization A vGround is used to experiment with malicious, 
destructive worms. A confined virtual network is necessary to strictly contain malicious worm traffic and worm 
damage. To this end, we have developed a link-layer network virtualization technique to safely intercept and 
completely confine worm traffic within the virtual playground. Our current vGround prototype supports both 
VMware and UML-based virtual machines. 
We have successfully experimented with a number of historical worms and their variants, including Lion worm 
[4], Slapper worm [37], Ramen worm [7], and SARS worm [lo]. For each experiment, the dynamic infection traces 
are captured using the tcpdump tool. The analysis is presented in the next section. 
'O~o te  that due to the limited scale of our current deployment, it is less likely to capture all of Internet worms which are active parlicularly 
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4.2 Extracting Behavioral Footprints 
With collected tcpdump log files, the next step is to extract flow sequences relevant to worm infections. We develop 
a tool named sneeze for this purpose: all TCPIUDPIICMP flow sequences contained within the log are extracted and 
additional packet reassembly or re-ordering, if necessary, is also performed. These TCP/UDPlICNIP sequences are 
separated with respect to each address pair and are further ordered based on the associated time-stamp. The duration 
and payload size of each flow is also automatically calculated by sneeze. 
An example output from sneeze is shown in Figure 6. The trace input is related to an complete infection session 
of the Sasser worm, which is captured by Collapsar on May 1,  2004. 
Figure 6. An Example Output of the Sneeze Tool 
Note that when analyzing related TCP flows, sneeze is able to track relevant TCP states. Specifically, within 
extracted TCP flows, any TCP control packet with SYN, ACK, FIN, or RST bit set are contained within the resulting 
infection sequence. The TCP data packets (though ACK bit turned on) are usually ignored. However, as discussed in 
Section 3.1, additional content sequence, protocol compliance analysis, or even vulnerability-related information can 
be integrated here to further enrich the accuracy and effectiveness of worm footprints. We are currently extending the 
prototype for such integration. UDP and ICMP flows are also recorded within the sequence. 
By considering each interaction as the behavioral phenotype, the algorithm described in Section 3 is applied on 
these multiple interaction sequences to extract representative behavioral footprints. The results are shown in Table 
1. Within the table, those letters denote either TCP flows with different control bits or UDPIICMP flows. Also, the 
letter Ci represents the well-known three-way TCP connection handshake. However, the same letter usually means 
different field contents (e.g., the destination port number) for different footprints. 
It is encouraging to note that we are able to reliably extract behavioral footprints for all worms examined. The 
footprint of the MSBlaster worm has been pictorially shown in Figure 2. Welchia worm'' is similar to MSBlaster 
worm except that an initial ICMP probing packet is generated before actual infection and the second TCP connection 
 he Welchia worm is a multi-vector worm. which takes advantage of two vulnerabilities, i.e., the RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026) 
and WebDAV vulnerability (MS03-007). Due to the lack of the vulnerable 11s server in our environment setup. the WebDAV-based infection 
is not able to be reproduced. 
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IV (w/ Flawed Implementation) 1V 
liifecriori Vecror 
RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026) 
RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026) 
WebDAV vulnerability (MS03-007) 
RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026) 
LSASS vulnerability (MS04-01 1) 
LPRng vulnerability (CVE-2000-0917) 
WU-FTPD vulnerability (CVE-2000-0573) 
NFS-UTILS vulnerability (CVE-2000-0666) 
BIND vulnerability (CA-2001-02) 
OpenSSL vulnerability (CA-2002-23) 
Samba vulnerability (CAN-2003-0201) 
Figure 7. Behavioral Footprints of the Ramen Worm, a Multi-Vector Worm 
t 
(C2) is initiated from the victim with a connect-back shell-code. Note that though MSBlaster and Welchia exploit 
the same vulnerability, their behavioral footprints are different. Enbiei worm exhibits a footprint similar to that of 
t 
MSBlaster worm but has a different worm binary and payload. Sasser worm uses thefrp protocol (C3) to download 
the worm replica. Within the ftp session, a PORT primitive is initiated to start another reverse connect-back activity 
(C4). 
Table 1 also shows the footprints of several historical worms, which are derived from our worm playground envi- 
ronment (vGround).   amen worm is a multi-vector worm, which has three infection vectors (IVs): LPRng (CVE- 
2000-091 7), wu-ftpd (CVE-2000-0573), and nfs-utils (CVE-2000-0666). Interestingly, the exploitation on the wu-ftp 
1V is flawed, which could not result in a success infection. The footprints for Ramen worms on different infection 
vectors are also visualized in Figure 7. Note that an initial TCP control packet with SYN and FIN bits (SF) set, 
source port being 21, and destination port being 21, is used to probe the victim among all three 1V-specific footprints. 
Another three examined worms, i.e., Lion, Slapper, and SARS worms, are single-vector worms. Lion worm has been 
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described in Section 2.3. We defer the discussion of Slapper worm in Section 4.4. SARS worm is a multi-platform 
worm, which is able to spread across various platforms (e.g, Debian 3.0, Gentoo 1.4.x, Mandrake 8.d9.0, Redhat 
6.x/7.x/8.019.0, Slackware 8.x19.0, SuSE 7.x18.x, FreeBSD 4.x15.0, NetBSD I .5/1.6, and OpenBSD 3.2). Its visual 
presentation is omitted due to space constraint. 
We would like to highlight that all of these behavior sequences are uniquely exhibited by the corresponding worms 
and to the best of our knowledge, are not exhibited within any other normal accesses to corresponding services. 
4.3 Uniqueness of Behavioral Footprinting 
Behavioral footprinting captures worms' characteristics based on their infection cycles. In this section, we demon- 
strate the benefit obtained from this new dimension for worm identification. To this end, we perform trace-driven 
worm recognition experiments. More specifically, the sneeze utility (Section 4.2) is modified to serve as a worm 
recognition tool using worms' behavioral footprints. We use a 7-hour trace (80M containing 3 live worm infections) 
collected by Collapsar [22] to demonstrate the benefit of worm behavioral footprinting. For comparison, we first 
apply a popular open-source content-based IDS, i.e., snort, to detect possible intrusions12. Our own tool, sneeze, is 
then applied to the same trace. Sneeze is able to identify all three worm infections in the trace with 0% false positive. 
The results from snort and sneeze are shown in Table 2 and Figure 8, respectively. 
I S17orr Sigrlarrwe I #Alerts I #Sources I # Dests 1 
I 1 I NETBIOS DCERPC ISystemActivator path overfiw attempt little endian 1 539 1 12 1 201 













1 1  
As Table 2 shows, snort performs reasonably well in recognizing various RPC DCOM buffer overflow attempts, 
and in reporting numerous alerts for "ICMP PING CyberKit 2.2 Windows", which correspond to the probing traffic 
from Welchia worms. However, these alerts are distinct alerts even though they might be caused by the same worm 
infection session. Figure 8 shows the result from sneeze. Sneeze naturally identifies 3 successfil worm infections and 
also reports 2 unsuccessful worm infections (which were not discovered in [22]). Further manual analysis shows that 
one unsuccessful worm infection has erroneously generated a wrong address (192.168.1.59) to download the worm 
replica while another unsuccessful infection has a flawed exploitation in binding the command shell service. Since 
flp protocol is used for all these worms, we would like to compare both outputs in this aspect. Table 2 reports 4 
NETBlOS SMB-DS Session Setup And X request l~nicode usemame overfiw attempt 
NETBIOS SMB-DS DCERPC NTLMSSP asn 1 overfiw attempt 
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Thu Nov 27 02:49:05 2003 21 s 123.10.9.127:1036 <-> 81.168.168.127:69 tRpiTJDP 12134 bytes 
Thu Nov 27 08:03:55 2003 O s 
Thu Nov 27 08:03:55 2003 0 s 
Thu Nov 27 08:03:55 2003 O s 
Thu Nm* 27 08:03:55 2003 4 s 
l'hu Nov 27 08 :03:56 2003 O s 
Thu Nov 27 08;03:56 2003 0 s 
Thu Nrm 27 08:03:56 2003 0 s 
Thu Nm- 27 08:03:56 2003 0 e 
123.10.16.220 -> 128.10.9.127 ICM? 64 hybrtas 
128.10.9.127 -> 128.10.16.220 ICIL.lF' 64 by-t-tes 
123.10.16.220'1567 -> 123.10.9.127:135 135iTC:P 436 bpen 
128.10.9.127:3912 -> 128.10.16.220:707 7071TCP 1686 bytes 
123.10.9.127:3953 <-> 128.10.16.220:69 IflpllJDF 
TWelchia V,'orm 
-1C1 byLes 
123 10.9.127:3953 <-> 128.1O.l6.22O:1605 1605:UWF 30196 bytes 
128.1O.9.127:3954 c-l, 123.10.16.220:69 tt3.pKTWP 4C b y t e s  
128.10.9.127.3954 <-> 128.10.16.220:1606 LB0dfiJI;rP 104Z2 bytes 
Figure 8. Worm Detection and Identification with Behavioral Footprints 
alerts with messages "TFTP GET" while Figure 8 further shows that one tftp is related to the Enbiei worm, one tftp 
is related to the MSBlaster worm, and the other two tftp are related to the Welchia worm, which uses one t ' p  session 
to download the file DLLHOST.exe (the worm payload) and the other rfrp session for SVCHOST.eze (a tftpd 
daemon). 
The comparison clearly demonstrates the uniqueness of the behavioral footprinting dimension. From the content 
dimension, snort inspects every incoming/outgoing packet and raises a general alert if a malicious content sequence is 
detected. From the behavior dimension, sneeze is able to recognize individual worms once the behavioral footprints 
are matched. 
4.4 Robustness of Behavioral Footprinting 
Previous subsections demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness in extracting behavioral footprints for worm 
characterization and recognition. In the following, we further compare the robustness of behavioral footprinting with 
the popular content fingerprinting dimension under three different types of mutation attacks. 
4.4.1 A Content-Mutation Attack 
In this experiment, we examine the robustness under a simple content-mutation attack. The Slapper worm is 
chosen for the comparison. 
Within the snort system, there are two Slapper-related signatures shown in Table 3. To compare, a vGround 
with 100 virtual nodes is firstly instantiated and an instance of the original Slapper worm is introduced into the 
environment. A tcpdump trace file containing the infection of slapper worms is randomly selected. Snort reports 
two alerts on the log file with the message "MISC OpenSSL Worm Traffic" and five alerts for "WEB-MISC Bad 
HTTPI 1 . 1  Request". 
Then, another experiment is conducted by performing a simple mutation of the Slapper worm content: replacing 
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Table 3. Snort Signatures for the Slapper Worm 
I 
2 
/ HTTPtlO". The same vGround is used to experiment with the modified Slapper worm. Once the contents are 
mutated, no alert is generated by snort from any worm propagation trace. Other recent work [45] has also confirmed 
Snort Signature 
TERM=xterrn 
GET / HTTPI I . I 
the in-effectiveness of content fingerprints under content mutation attacks. 
Alert Message 
MISC OpenSSL Worm Traffi c 
WEB-MISC Bad HTTP/I .I 
Reauest. Potentiallv Worm Attack 
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Figure 9. The Behavior Footprint of the Slapper Worm 
Behavioral footprinting demonstrates its robustness under this attack. In both cases, sneeze is able to identify the 
same behavioral sequence of the Slapper worm. As visualized in Figure 9, the slapper worm firstly opens a normal 
t 
TCP connection (C1 Fl F l )  against port 80 checking the reachability of remote host; It then issues an invalid HTTP 
t 
GET request (C2F2,  half-close containing the second content signature used in snort) to grab the server banner and 
query the version of web server; Later on, it further establishes 20 simultaneous plain TCP connections Ci, 
opened without any payload and never shutdown) on 443 port to prepare for the two following exploitations (C23, 
C24). Finally, a fluny (> 10; 000) of short packets (1 byte in payload) can be observed for the C24 TCP connection. 
4.4.2 A Traffic-Encryption Attack 
In this experiment, we examine the robustness when the whole worm traffic is encrypted. 
As pointed out in [37], the original Slapper worm is propagated through the transmission of a uuencoded version of 
the unencrypted worm source code. In this experiment, a synthesized Slapper variant is first instructed to encrypt the 
worm source file before propagation and then it is instructed to decrypt the file before compiling it and executing the 
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Figure 10. N-Gram Analysis on the Original Slap- Figure 11. N-Gram Analysis of the Slapper Worm 
per Worm Variant with Encrypted Transmission 
worm binary in the infected victim. N-Gram analysis (counting the frequency of n-length combinations of bytes) is 
performed over two infection instances: one for the original Slapper worm with transfer of unencrypted worm source 
(shown in Figure 10) and the other for the Slapper worm variant with encrypted source (shown in Figure I I ) .  
The N-gram analysis on the original Slapper worm trace shows several common strings with a much higher fre- 
quency of occurrence than other strings. However, these strings are not the same as the signature adopted in snort to 
detect Slapper worms. In fact, the signature used in snort "TERM=xterm7' only happens twice within the N-Gram 
analysis. It suggests that the most-recurring content blocks are not necessarily suitable for signature purpose. Once 
the transmission is encrypted, almost every string has equal probability of occurrence. On the other hand, the se- 
t t 
quence C1 Fl FlC2F2 u;z3 CiC23C24 is exhibited in both the original and the synthesized Slapper worm infections, 
which demonstrates the applicability of behavioral footprinting even to worms that encrypt their traffic. 
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Figure 12. A Phylogenetic Tree Built from 20 Polymorphic Behavioral Sequences of the Slapper Worm 
Variant 
4.4.3 A Behavior-Polymorphism Attack 
The previous two experiments demonstrate the robustness of worm footprints against content-mutation and traffic 
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Instead of following the behavior sequence shown in its original footprint, a behavior-polymorphic Slapper worm 
variant is crafted, which is capable of ( I )  intentionally introducing an arbitrary number of irrelevant or miscellaneous 
sequences during the infection 1 3 ;  (2) intentionally adding a certain random timing delay among any two consecutive 
infection steps; and (3) intelligently changing the IP address from which to download the attack payload, including 
the worm replica. However, as restricted by the way to exploit the OpenSSL heap vulnerability (Section 3.3.1), the 
temporal order in the original behavior sequence has to be maintained to ensure successful infection. 
A vGround with 1500 virtual nodes is constructed and all successful infection sessions are recorded for sequence 
analysis. For brevity and readability, Figure 12 only shows the phylogenetic tree built from collected traces with 
20 infection instances. The numbers in the leaf nodes are index numbers from 1 to 20. The values in intermediate 
nodes indicate normalized similarity ([O: I.]) based on Smith-Waterman algorithm (Section 3.2). Lower value indicates 
higher similarity between the two sub-clusters. The penalty used for each gap through the algorithm is p = -2 and 
the scoring matrix used for Smith-Waterman algorithm is 
2, x i = y j  
s ( i .  j )  = (4) 
-1; otherwise. 
As we observe, the phylogenetic tree algorithm is still able to extract the most critical part of the original be- 
havior sequence: n:z3 C$23C24, demonstrating the resilience of behavioral footprinting against the behavior- 
polymorphism attack. 
5 Limitations 
As a new dimension to characterize self-propagating worms, behavioral footprinting shows great potential in iden- 
tifying all infection incidents of each real-world worm we have experimented with. However, we would like to point 
out that behavioral footprinting is proposed to enrich worm characterization along with other dimensions, e.g., con- 
tent fingerprinting. It alone could lead to either incomplete or inaccurate worm characterization. In the following, we 
describe current limitations of behavioral footprinting. Such limitations also call for further improvement of this new 
dimension and the adoption of a multiple-dimensional approach to worm characterization and identification. 
Behavior substitution attacks Our current pairwise alignment algorithm leverages a basic sequence alignment 
technique, or more specifically, a simple predefined scoring matrix (Section 3.2), to align worm infection sequences 
where a worm-identifying behavioral footprint is derived. An attacker might intentionally introduce some substi- 
tutable subsequence, which attempts to corrupt the alignment process while still achieves its goal for infection or 
propagation. For example, within the Replication phase (Figure I), different transport channels or even tunneling can 
I3we would like to point out that though the worm is able to initiate the connections (e.g., ICMPITCPIUDP flows) to the victim node, it can 
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be leveraged to retrieve the worm replica. 
However, if we re-examine the motivation behind the sequence analysis and consider each behavior substitution 
as a possible mutation, such attack is reminiscent of the classic challenge faced by biologists on how to optimally 
align gene sequences under possible mutations. It is interesting to note that two popular scoring matrices used in 
gene sequence alignment, i.e., PAM [ I  81 and BLOSSOM [18], have been constantly evolved (and are still evolving) 
to reflect newly-discovered mutations for decades. Similarly, considering the scoring matrix behind our algorithm is 
primitive as it simply returns I if two flows are fully matched, additional efforts are still necessary to refine the scoring 
matrix. Fortunately, our application domain is different from the original biological domain as a worm usually can 
not evolve itself at runtime and has relatively limited number of possible substitutions. In addition, a worm capable 
of substituting its infection steps is likely to be more bloated (e.g., reflected by its replica size) than a compact one. 
An over-bloated worm is more likely to be detected in the first place. 
Behavior-camouflaging attacks Behavioral footprinting is designed to capture a worm's infection steps exposed 
during its infection. A worm author might attempt to inject fake steps into the infection sequences. After these fake 
steps have been included in the worm's behavioral footprint, the worm will stop exhibiting these fake steps. As a 
result, the behavioral footprint will experience a sudden increase in false negatives because a full match against the 
footprint will fail from now on. The fundamental solution is to identify and remove those fake steps using techniques 
such as semantic-level analysis [34,44], which is an on-going, challenging research topic. Another possible approach 
is to mitigate such attack by adopting partial instead of full footprint matching. However, a trade-off will be made 
to determine the confidence level of the partial matching to avoid the opposite, namely high false positives. Other 
dimensions (e.g., content fingerprinting) may provide complementary capability in this case. 
6 Related work 
Due to the significant threat imposed by self-propagating worms, security researchers have explored various di- 
mensions to first capture worms' uniqueness and then apply them for worm identification. 
Among the most notable, content fingerprinting [26, 28, 33, 431 has been widely examined and utilized to derive 
the most representative content sequences. Realizing the inconvenience in manually extract the content sequences, 
several systems such as Honeycomb [28], Autograph [26], EarlyBird [43] and Polygraph [33] have been recently pro- 
posed to automate the content-based signature extraction process. However, a content sequence is only able to detect 
the worm activity within one infection step or most likely, the exploitation stage (Figure 1). Behavioral footprint- 
ing instead is proposed to capture worms' uniqueness during its entire infection session, which nicely complements 
content fingerprinting (Section 4.3). 
Another dimension, anomaly detection [ l ,  2, 3, 24, 29, 39, 481, leverages the insight that worms are likely to 
generate anomalous behaviors such as port scanning [24] and failed connection attempts [ l ,  2, 31, which are different 




















not intended to idenrfi worms. In other words, i t  mainly answers the question "is there a worm infection?", not the 
question "which worm is this?". 
Other promising dimensions include vulnerability-specific characterization [ I ,  32, 471 and semantic-aware taint- 
edness tracking [14, 15, 34, 40, 441. Shield [47] or similarly Worm Vaccine [I] and Generic Exploit Blocking [32] 
propose the notion of vulnerability-specific signature and use it to accurately filter out attack flows. Taintcheck [34], 
Minos [15], Vigilante [14], and other related systems [40,44] enable the detection of unknown attacks by associating 
a tag to untrusted information sources and reporting an alert if a tainted instruction is executed. These schemes are 
generally applicable even to detect unknown attacks or intrusions. While capable of detecting the occurrence of a 
possible exploitation, they do not attempt to characterize the entire worm infection process where exploitation is only 
one of the infection phases. 
Different from these dimensions, behavioral footprinting is a new but complementary dimension. Recently, another 
related behavior-oriented approach 1191 is proposed. However, it focuses on the inter-machine propagation pattern 
(tree) exhibited by worms as well as the similar payload from one machine to another. Moreover, it implicitly assumes 
the existence of worms' behavioral footprints, without justifying the existence and proposing the extraction of worm 
behavioral footprints, which is the focus of our work. 
7 Conclusion 
We have presented a new promising dimension, behavioral footprinting, to enrich the worm characterization space. 
Orthogonal and complementary to existing dimensions, behavioral footprinting characterizes the temporal worm 
infection process. Efficient and robust algorithms are proposed to accurately and reliably extract worm behavioral 
footprints. Our experiments with real-world worms, in comparison with the content-based fingerprinting approach, 
clearly demonstrate the feasibility, uniqueness, and robustness of behavioral footprinting. 
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